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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3476 
___________ 
 
J.H. GROUP, LLC, d/b/a OCEAN ROLLING CHAIRS; 
JOHN TAIMANGLO; STEPHANIE TAIMANGLO, 
                                                 Appellants 
 
v. 
 
ROYAL ROLLING CHAIRS, LLC; WILLIAM BOLAND; GARY HILL; 
JOHN SCHULTZ; CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY; JOHN DOES(S) A-K; 
JANE DOE(S) A-K, being present and former counsel persons known or unknown on 
behalf of ATLANTIC CITY with regard to any and all control, supervisor, monitoring 
the rolling chair business on behalf of ATLANTIC CITY; THEODORE GARRY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil Action No. 11-cv-01595) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 15, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 17, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 John and Stephanie Taimanglo, proceeding pro se, appeal an order of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing their complaint under the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
 The Taimanglos filed a complaint through counsel in District Court pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the City of Atlantic City, Royal Rolling Chairs, LLC, and 
other defendants conspired to destroy their business, Ocean Rolling Chairs, through 
unnecessary inspections and other unfair treatment.  The Taimanglos averred that Ocean 
Rolling Chairs d/b/a J.H. Group, LLC is a legal organization that operates the business of 
providing rolling chairs on the Atlantic City boardwalk.  The business leases rolling chair 
equipment to independent contractors.  The Taimanglos averred that they are the sole 
stockholders and sole members of Ocean Rolling Chairs and J.H. Group and the sole 
owners of all interest in J.H. Group.
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 Royal Rolling Chairs and the City of Atlantic City moved to dismiss the complaint 
under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, asserting that the Taimanglos made inconsistent 
statements in a bankruptcy petition filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of New Jersey five months after filing their complaint.  The Taimanglos attested 
in their bankruptcy filings that they had no income from the operation of business, that 
                                              
1
J.H. Group, LLC d/b/a Ocean Rolling Chairs was a party to the complaint but is 
not participating in this appeal. 
 3 
their income was wage income, that they did not own more than five percent of the 
voting or equity securities of a business, and that they were not self-employed full or 
part-time.  The Taimanglos attested they did not own any stock and interest in 
incorporated and unincorporated businesses or interest in partnerships or joint ventures.  
They also declared that they had no contingent and unliquidated claims and that they 
owned no office equipment, furnishings, or supplies used in business. 
 After a hearing, the District Court ruled that the Taimanglos were judicially 
estopped from bringing their present action.  Applying the factors in Krystal Cadillac-
Oldsmobile GMC Truck Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2003), 
the District Court found that the Taimanglos had taken inconsistent positions by failing to 
disclose their business and the present lawsuit in their bankruptcy petition while at the 
same time bringing this suit based on their ownership of Ocean Rolling Chairs.  The 
District Court found that the nature and frequency of the inconsistencies established bad 
faith, noting that the financial problems in the rolling chair business were the impetus to 
filing for bankruptcy.  Although the bankruptcy petition was ultimately dismissed, the 
District Court found that dismissal of the Taimanglos’ § 1983 action was appropriate 
because a lesser sanction would send a message that a debtor should disclose assets only 
if he is caught hiding them.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s decision for abuse of discretion.  Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. 
Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 780 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 4 
 As recognized by the District Court, the “basic principle of judicial estoppel . . . is 
that absent any good explanation, a party should not be allowed to gain an advantage by 
litigation on one theory, and then seek an inconsistent advantage by pursuing an 
incompatible theory.”  Krystal, 337 F.3d at 319 (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. 
Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 1996)).  The Taimanglos do not 
dispute the District Court’s finding that they took inconsistent positions in their 
bankruptcy filings and in this case.  Their sole argument on appeal is that they gave their 
bankruptcy attorney all information about their income, assets, and pending lawsuits and 
that their attorney neglected to include this information in their bankruptcy filings.
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 The District Court rejected this argument, stating that the fact that the Taimanglos 
gave documents to their attorney did not relieve them of their obligation for candor to the 
bankruptcy court.  We agree.  Other courts of appeals have upheld the application of the 
judicial estoppel doctrine where a party, who had knowledge of an undisclosed claim and 
had motive to conceal it, argued that his or her attorney was responsible for the non-
disclosure.  See, e.g., Barger v. City of Cartersville, GA, 348 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 
2003); In re Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d 197, 212 (5th Cir. 1999).  The Taimanglos do not 
challenge the District Court’s findings that they had knowledge of their present claim 
when they filed for bankruptcy and that they had a motive to shield their assets. 
                                              
2
We do not consider the correspondence attached to the Taimanglos’ brief, which 
is not part of the District Court record.  See In re Capital Cities/ABC Inc.’s Application 
for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting court cannot 
consider material on appeal that is outside the district court record). 
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 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
